Orbital infrastructure / Aerosyn Inc.
Keep Hubble discovering.
The Aerosyn Hubble Continuity Study
Public mission concept · researched 5 November 2026
Our proposal is to help assemble a qualified team that can give Hubble more opportunity to do science, while developing the robotics, computing infrastructure and human expertise needed to maintain valuable systems in orbit.
The first objective is a safe reboost. Any repair or upgrade would need its own engineering case. Aerosyn would seek a supporting role in an experienced servicing consortium, beginning with simulation, mission software, ground computing and training. These are proposed contributions, not demonstrated Aerosyn flight capabilities.
NASA has opened a real conversation.
NASA issued its Hubble servicing request for information on 29 October 2026. It asks about reboosting the telescope to at least 600 km, improving it through servicing, and safe disposal at the end of its mission. NASA anticipates a servicing mission would need to occur by 2032. Its current public estimate places likely atmospheric reentry without intervention in 2033 to 2034; that is a forecast, not a safe waiting period.
NASA's current announcement explains the planning window. The official notice, 80GSFC27RFIHSTS, lists a response deadline of 30 November 2026 at 3 p.m. EST (20:00 UTC). Check that notice for amendments. An RFI gathers information: it is not a request for proposals, contract award or funding commitment, and NASA does not pay for these responses.
Current status: independent Aerosyn research and a proposed feasibility program. No NASA partnership, selected mission, secured funding, confirmed supplier team or RFI submission. Hubble remains a NASA/ESA science mission; this concept confers no ownership or telescope time on Aerosyn.
01 / Establish whether the mission closes.
Start with NASA-coordinated technical access and an experienced rendezvous-and-servicing lead. Bring together prospective launch, propulsion, capture, guidance, mission assurance and science-operations specialists. Record which organization would own each requirement, what it has actually demonstrated, and what remains to be developed. No partners are confirmed in this brief.
The first decision package would evaluate a servicer that separates after reboost alongside one that remains attached. Use current orbit and attitude data, measured mass properties and approved interface drawings. Estimate propulsion, power, thermal, communications, launch and operations needs, the effect on observing time, and the cost and risk of eventual disposal. Choose an architecture only after assessing both options.
Hubble has no propulsion to maintain its own orbit. NASA installed a soft-capture system in 2009, but its existence does not establish compatibility with a particular modern spacecraft. The mating mechanism, load path, navigation targets, structural condition and capture envelope must be verified. See NASA's servicing hardware description.
02 / Prove the dangerous parts away from Hubble.
Build a physics-based simulation tied to verified engineering data, with six-degree-of-freedom motion, flexible structures, contact dynamics and realistic sensor uncertainty. Test changing illumination, target rotation, navigation errors, lost communications, sensor failures, thruster faults and an interrupted docking attempt. A world model can generate test situations; independently checked dynamics and hardware tests must establish whether a maneuver is safe.
Use a representative capture interface on a ground test rig, then hardware-in-the-loop navigation and control. Our proposed flight gate is a demonstration against a purpose-built inert target before approaching Hubble. The review must establish numerical capture loads and rates, collision-avoidance boundaries, retreat maneuvers, combined-stack control and command authority. This brief does not yet establish those flight limits.
Learning systems would support ground analysis and bounded onboard functions only after verification. An independent safety controller and human-authorized mission transitions would enforce the approved approach and abort rules. We would require fault-injection evidence and independent mission assurance before a go/no-go review.
03 / Inspect, capture and reboost.
With NASA authorization, inspect from a safe stand-off distance, confirm the actual capture conditions, and approach through approved hold points. If the measured state falls outside the verified envelope, retreat. Capture through the qualified interface, establish control of the combined vehicle, and perform the approved reboost sequence to an orbit meeting the RFI's minimum 600 km objective.
The science case and safety analysis must address thruster plumes, optical contamination, outgassing, structural loads, vibration, power, thermal conditions, debris exposure and pointing performance. A higher orbit reduces drag, but it also changes radiation and disposal conditions. Altitude alone cannot guarantee useful observing years or repair an aging component.
Verify the achieved orbit, spacecraft health and science performance before declaring success. NASA's Hubble operations team would retain observatory authority. Whether the servicer separates or remains would follow the approved architecture, with the corresponding science and end-of-life consequences evaluated before launch.
These are proposed engineering gates informed by NASA's Hubble proximity-operations risk study; they are not an approved flight procedure.
04 / Make every upgrade earn the risk.
Evaluate gyroscope, power or other serviceable hardware improvements as separate options, based on actual failure modes, access, replacement parts and demonstrated tooling. NASA returned Hubble to science in one-gyro operation in June 2024. Reboosting it does not restore failed gyros. An upgrade should proceed only if its expected science benefit justifies the added cost, downtime and risk.
Carry a funded end-of-life strategy from the first architecture review. Preserve an approved path to controlled disposal, including contingency resources and responsibility if the observatory or servicer fails. A successful life-extension mission must also leave a responsible ending.
What Earth receives.
Hubble's ultraviolet, visible and near-infrared observations remain valuable to astronomers studying stars, galaxies, planets and their environments. Continued operation could extend those scientific records. NASA and the science community would determine observing priorities through the established allocation process.
Aerosyn could begin useful work on Earth before a flight program exists: reproducible tools for already public Hubble data in the MAST archive, documented image and spectral analysis, and workstations configured for those tasks. Preserve instrument calibration, uncertainty, provenance and citations. AI-generated detail must never be presented as an observation.
For communities and schools, we propose training projects using public datasets and representative servicing rigs. For future operations, build training around anomaly diagnosis, robotics maintenance, mission rehearsal and supervised decision-making. Publish measured learning outcomes and actual roles as they exist; this concept does not announce funded jobs or an accredited qualification.
Hubble observes the universe. NASA explains in its Hubble FAQ that Earth's brightness and apparent motion make ordinary Earth observations unsuitable. The benefit for Earth here is science, skills and technology developed through careful work.
How this connects to orbital computing.
Begin with ground infrastructure: simulation workstations, mission rehearsal servers, archive processing and an auditable record of operator decisions. Benchmark each workload against the simpler alternative, with cost, energy use, reliability and scientific accuracy measured.
A later orbital compute experiment would be a separate spacecraft with its own launch case, power, heat rejection, radiation tolerance, communications, cybersecurity, collision avoidance and disposal plan. Evaluate whether processing data near its source creates enough value to justify flying it. Hubble's power, precision pointing and observing schedule must not become dependencies for an unrelated computing demonstration.
The connection is a common engineering discipline: systems that can be inspected, maintained and retired responsibly, supported by people who understand them. Experience from a qualified servicing program could inform a future orbital infrastructure study. It would not, by itself, prove a space data center viable.
A business case that protects the science.
Aerosyn would seek defined work packages in simulation, validated software, ground systems and training, with payment tied to verifiable deliverables. An experienced mission lead would need to price launch, spacecraft, propulsion, testing, insurance, operations and disposal. Financing could be public, private or mixed if a later agreement permits it; this RFI establishes none of those arrangements.
We would separate the rescue mission's budget from optional upgrades, educational work and any later compute experiment. Our commercial case would be based on engineering services and useful tools. It would not depend on selling ownership of Hubble, exclusive public-archive access or unallocated telescope time.
The next decision package.
Before any response, prepare a requirement-by-requirement feasibility matrix: objective experience and capability gaps; prospective suppliers; component readiness; approach and capture limits; docked duration and stack control; earliest credible mission date; cost and payment schedule; NASA technical and financial contributions requested; risks, tests and disposal responsibilities. Unknown quantities must remain explicitly unknown until supported.
The official RFI allows a PDF of up to 25 pages and specifies its format and handling requirements. A website brief is not that response. No response has been submitted. The first useful result would be a technically candid team and feasibility package that NASA can assess, rather than a flight promise.
Seeking qualified collaborators: spacecraft servicing and capture teams, guidance and control specialists, launch integrators, mission assurance engineers, astronomers and workforce educators. Describe relevant demonstrated experience, the contribution you could own, and the evidence needed to assess it.
Discuss a specific contribution
Sources are linked beside the claims they support. Mission stages, Aerosyn roles and business structure are our proposals, not NASA requirements or endorsements. This page will need revision as the notice or mission evidence changes.